Split View: 컨테이너 보안 & 공급망 보안 완전 가이드 2025: 이미지 스캐닝, Sigstore, SBOM, 런타임 보안

Container Security Layers:
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Layer 6: Supply Chain                            │
│  - Base image poisoning, dependency tampering     │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ Layer 5: Orchestration (Kubernetes)              │
│  - Missing RBAC, exposed API server, unencrypted │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ Layer 4: Network                                 │
│  - Missing network policies, no service mesh     │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ Layer 3: Runtime                                 │
│  - Container escape, privilege escalation, mining │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ Layer 2: Image                                   │
│  - CVEs, hardcoded secrets, excessive packages   │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ Layer 1: Host OS / Container Runtime             │
│  - Kernel vulns, Docker socket exposure, runc    │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────┘

1. Image Vulnerability Exploitation:
   Attacker -> Exploit known CVEs in public images -> Container compromise

2. Supply Chain Attack:
   Attacker -> Inject malware in base image/library -> Downstream poisoning

3. Runtime Attack:
   Attacker -> Exploit vulnerable app -> Container escape -> Host access

4. Misconfiguration Exploitation:
   Attacker -> Excessive permissions/missing policies -> Lateral movement

# BAD: Full image (200MB+, potentially hundreds of CVEs)
FROM ubuntu:22.04
RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y python3
COPY app.py /app/
CMD ["python3", "/app/app.py"]

# GOOD: Distroless image (minimal binaries only)
FROM python:3.12-slim AS builder
WORKDIR /app
COPY requirements.txt .
RUN pip install --no-cache-dir -r requirements.txt
COPY . .

FROM gcr.io/distroless/python3-debian12
COPY --from=builder /app /app
COPY --from=builder /usr/local/lib/python3.12/site-packages /usr/local/lib/python3.12/site-packages
WORKDIR /app
CMD ["app.py"]

# Chainguard Images: rebuilt daily, zero-CVE goal
FROM cgr.dev/chainguard/python:latest-dev AS builder
WORKDIR /app
COPY requirements.txt .
RUN pip install --no-cache-dir -r requirements.txt
COPY . .

FROM cgr.dev/chainguard/python:latest
COPY --from=builder /app /app
COPY --from=builder /home/nonroot/.local/lib/python3.12/site-packages /home/nonroot/.local/lib/python3.12/site-packages
WORKDIR /app
ENTRYPOINT ["python", "app.py"]

# Go app multi-stage build
FROM golang:1.22-alpine AS builder

# Security: install build-only tools
RUN apk add --no-cache git ca-certificates

WORKDIR /src
COPY go.mod go.sum ./
RUN go mod download

COPY . .

# Security: static binary (CGO disabled)
RUN CGO_ENABLED=0 GOOS=linux GOARCH=amd64 \
    go build -ldflags="-w -s" -o /app/server ./cmd/server

# Final image: scratch (completely empty)
FROM scratch

# Security: non-root user
COPY --from=builder /etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt /etc/ssl/certs/
COPY --from=builder /etc/passwd /etc/passwd
COPY --from=builder /app/server /server

USER 65534:65534
ENTRYPOINT ["/server"]

# Security-hardened Dockerfile
FROM node:20-slim AS builder

# Security: create non-root user
RUN groupadd -r appuser && useradd -r -g appuser -d /app appuser

WORKDIR /app

# Security: copy package.json first (layer caching)
COPY package.json yarn.lock ./
RUN yarn install --frozen-lockfile --production

COPY . .
RUN yarn build

# Production image
FROM node:20-slim

# Security: non-root user
RUN groupadd -r appuser && useradd -r -g appuser -d /app appuser

WORKDIR /app

# Security: copy only necessary files
COPY --from=builder --chown=appuser:appuser /app/dist ./dist
COPY --from=builder --chown=appuser:appuser /app/node_modules ./node_modules
COPY --from=builder --chown=appuser:appuser /app/package.json ./

# Security: run as non-root
USER appuser

# Security: read-only filesystem compatible
ENV NODE_ENV=production

EXPOSE 3000
CMD ["node", "dist/index.js"]

# Image scan
trivy image nginx:1.25

# Filter by severity
trivy image --severity HIGH,CRITICAL nginx:1.25

# SARIF output (GitHub Security integration)
trivy image --format sarif --output trivy-results.sarif nginx:1.25

# Secret scan
trivy image --scanners secret myapp:latest

# IaC scan (Dockerfile, Kubernetes YAML)
trivy config .

# Generate SBOM
trivy image --format cyclonedx --output sbom.json nginx:1.25

# .trivyignore - ignore specific CVEs
# Document reason in comments
# CVE-2023-xxxx: Not applicable in our environment (feature not used)
CVE-2023-xxxx

# Generate SBOM with syft
syft packages nginx:1.25 -o cyclonedx-json > sbom.json

# Scan SBOM with Grype
grype sbom:./sbom.json

# Direct image scan with Grype
grype nginx:1.25

# Set severity threshold (for CI/CD)
grype nginx:1.25 --fail-on critical

# .github/workflows/image-scan.yml
name: Container Image Scan

on:
  push:
    branches: [main]
  pull_request:

jobs:
  build-and-scan:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@v4

      - name: Build image
        run: docker build -t myapp:ci .

      - name: Run Trivy vulnerability scanner
        uses: aquasecurity/trivy-action@master
        with:
          image-ref: 'myapp:ci'
          format: 'sarif'
          output: 'trivy-results.sarif'
          severity: 'CRITICAL,HIGH'
          exit-code: '1'

      - name: Upload Trivy scan results
        uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@v3
        if: always()
        with:
          sarif_file: 'trivy-results.sarif'

      - name: Run Grype scan
        uses: anchore/scan-action@v4
        with:
          image: 'myapp:ci'
          fail-build: true
          severity-cutoff: 'high'

Sigstore Components:
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│  cosign                                           │
│  - Sign and verify container images/artifacts     │
│  - Keyless signing support (OIDC-based)           │
├──────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│  Rekor                                            │
│  - Immutable transparency log                     │
│  - All signatures stored publicly                 │
├──────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│  Fulcio                                           │
│  - Short-lived certificate issuance (CA)          │
│  - Converts OIDC tokens to X.509 certificates     │
└──────────────────────────────────────────────────┘

# Generate key pair
cosign generate-key-pair

# Sign image
cosign sign --key cosign.key myregistry.com/myapp:v1.0

# Verify image signature
cosign verify --key cosign.pub myregistry.com/myapp:v1.0

# Keyless signing (recommended for CI/CD)
# Auto-authenticates with OIDC token (GitHub Actions, GitLab CI)
cosign sign myregistry.com/myapp:v1.0

# Keyless verification
cosign verify \
  --certificate-identity "https://github.com/myorg/myapp/.github/workflows/build.yml@refs/heads/main" \
  --certificate-oidc-issuer "https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com" \
  myregistry.com/myapp:v1.0

# .github/workflows/sign-image.yml
name: Build, Sign, and Push

on:
  push:
    tags: ['v*']

permissions:
  contents: read
  packages: write
  id-token: write  # Required for keyless signing

jobs:
  build-sign-push:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@v4

      - uses: sigstore/cosign-installer@v3

      - name: Login to GHCR
        uses: docker/login-action@v3
        with:
          registry: ghcr.io
          username: "${{ github.actor }}"
          password: "${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}"

      - name: Build and push
        id: build
        uses: docker/build-push-action@v5
        with:
          push: true
          tags: "ghcr.io/${{ github.repository }}:${{ github.ref_name }}"

      - name: Sign the image (keyless)
        run: |
          cosign sign --yes \
            "ghcr.io/${{ github.repository }}@${{ steps.build.outputs.digest }}"

# Kyverno policy: allow only signed images
apiVersion: kyverno.io/v1
kind: ClusterPolicy
metadata:
  name: verify-image-signature
spec:
  validationFailureAction: Enforce
  background: false
  rules:
    - name: verify-cosign-signature
      match:
        any:
          - resources:
              kinds:
                - Pod
      verifyImages:
        - imageReferences:
            - "ghcr.io/myorg/*"
          attestors:
            - entries:
                - keyless:
                    subject: "https://github.com/myorg/*/.github/workflows/*@refs/heads/main"
                    issuer: "https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com"
                    rekor:
                      url: "https://rekor.sigstore.dev"

CycloneDX:
- OWASP project
- Security-focused (vulnerabilities, licenses)
- JSON, XML formats
- VEX (Vulnerability Exploitability eXchange) support

SPDX:
- Linux Foundation project
- License compliance focused
- JSON, RDF, Tag-Value formats
- ISO/IEC 5962:2021 international standard

# Generate SBOM in CycloneDX format
syft packages myapp:latest -o cyclonedx-json > sbom-cyclonedx.json

# Generate SBOM in SPDX format
syft packages myapp:latest -o spdx-json > sbom-spdx.json

# Scan directory
syft dir:./my-project -o cyclonedx-json > project-sbom.json

# Attach SBOM to image (cosign + SBOM)
cosign attach sbom --sbom sbom-cyclonedx.json myregistry.com/myapp:v1.0

# Create SBOM attestation
cosign attest --predicate sbom-cyclonedx.json \
  --type cyclonedx \
  myregistry.com/myapp:v1.0

# Scan vulnerabilities from SBOM
grype sbom:./sbom-cyclonedx.json

# Query specific packages
syft packages myapp:latest | grep log4j

# License analysis
syft packages myapp:latest -o json | \
  jq '.artifacts[].licenses[].value' | sort | uniq -c | sort -rn

Privileged:
- No restrictions
- Known privilege escalation allowed
- For system daemons, CNI plugins

Baseline:
- Prevents known privilege escalation
- Blocks hostNetwork, hostPID, hostIPC
- Blocks privileged containers
- Suitable for most workloads

Restricted:
- Least privilege principle applied
- Non-root enforced
- All capabilities dropped
- seccomp profile required
- For security-critical workloads

# Apply Pod Security Standards to Namespace
apiVersion: v1
kind: Namespace
metadata:
  name: production
  labels:
    # Enforce Restricted level
    pod-security.kubernetes.io/enforce: restricted
    pod-security.kubernetes.io/enforce-version: latest
    # Warn on Restricted violations
    pod-security.kubernetes.io/warn: restricted
    pod-security.kubernetes.io/warn-version: latest
    # Audit Restricted violations
    pod-security.kubernetes.io/audit: restricted
    pod-security.kubernetes.io/audit-version: latest

# Pod spec satisfying Restricted level
apiVersion: apps/v1
kind: Deployment
metadata:
  name: secure-app
  namespace: production
spec:
  replicas: 3
  selector:
    matchLabels:
      app: secure-app
  template:
    metadata:
      labels:
        app: secure-app
    spec:
      # Security: disable auto-mount of SA token
      automountServiceAccountToken: false

      securityContext:
        # Security: run as non-root group
        runAsGroup: 1000
        fsGroup: 1000
        # Security: apply Seccomp profile
        seccompProfile:
          type: RuntimeDefault

      containers:
        - name: app
          image: ghcr.io/myorg/secure-app:v1.0
          ports:
            - containerPort: 8080
              protocol: TCP

          securityContext:
            # Security: run as non-root
            runAsNonRoot: true
            runAsUser: 1000
            # Security: read-only root filesystem
            readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
            # Security: block privilege escalation
            allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
            # Security: drop all capabilities
            capabilities:
              drop:
                - ALL

          volumeMounts:
            - name: tmp
              mountPath: /tmp
            - name: cache
              mountPath: /app/cache

          resources:
            requests:
              cpu: 100m
              memory: 128Mi
            limits:
              cpu: 500m
              memory: 512Mi

      volumes:
        - name: tmp
          emptyDir:
            sizeLimit: 100Mi
        - name: cache
          emptyDir:
            sizeLimit: 200Mi

# Block all ingress/egress (default deny)
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
  name: default-deny-all
  namespace: production
spec:
  podSelector: {}
  policyTypes:
    - Ingress
    - Egress

# API service: allow ingress only from specific sources
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
  name: api-service-policy
  namespace: production
spec:
  podSelector:
    matchLabels:
      app: api-service
  policyTypes:
    - Ingress
    - Egress
  ingress:
    # Allow only from ingress controller
    - from:
        - namespaceSelector:
            matchLabels:
              name: ingress-nginx
          podSelector:
            matchLabels:
              app: ingress-nginx
      ports:
        - protocol: TCP
          port: 8080
  egress:
    # Allow database access
    - to:
        - podSelector:
            matchLabels:
              app: postgres
      ports:
        - protocol: TCP
          port: 5432
    # Allow DNS
    - to:
        - namespaceSelector: {}
          podSelector:
            matchLabels:
              k8s-app: kube-dns
      ports:
        - protocol: UDP
          port: 53
        - protocol: TCP
          port: 53

# Cilium L7 Network Policy (HTTP path-based)
apiVersion: cilium.io/v2
kind: CiliumNetworkPolicy
metadata:
  name: api-l7-policy
  namespace: production
spec:
  endpointSelector:
    matchLabels:
      app: api-service
  ingress:
    - fromEndpoints:
        - matchLabels:
            app: frontend
      toPorts:
        - ports:
            - port: "8080"
              protocol: TCP
          rules:
            http:
              - method: "GET"
                path: "/api/v1/products"
              - method: "POST"
                path: "/api/v1/orders"

# Falco custom rules
- rule: Detect Reverse Shell
  desc: Detect reverse shell connection attempts in containers
  condition: >
    evt.type=connect and
    evt.dir=< and
    container and
    fd.typechar=4 and
    fd.rip != "127.0.0.1" and
    proc.name in (bash, sh, zsh, dash, csh)
  output: >
    Reverse shell detected (user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline
    connection=%fd.name container=%container.name
    image=%container.image.repository)
  priority: CRITICAL
  tags: [network, shell, mitre_execution]

- rule: Detect Cryptomining
  desc: Detect cryptocurrency mining processes in containers
  condition: >
    spawned_process and
    container and
    (proc.name in (xmrig, minerd, minergate, cpuminer) or
     proc.cmdline contains "stratum+tcp" or
     proc.cmdline contains "cryptonight")
  output: >
    Cryptomining detected (user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline
    container=%container.name image=%container.image.repository)
  priority: CRITICAL
  tags: [crypto, mining, mitre_resource_hijacking]

- rule: Sensitive File Access
  desc: Detect access to sensitive files
  condition: >
    open_read and
    container and
    (fd.name startswith /etc/shadow or
     fd.name startswith /etc/passwd or
     fd.name startswith /proc/self/environ or
     fd.name startswith /run/secrets)
  output: >
    Sensitive file access (user=%user.name file=%fd.name
    command=%proc.cmdline container=%container.name)
  priority: WARNING
  tags: [filesystem, mitre_credential_access]

# Install Falco
helm repo add falcosecurity https://falcosecurity.github.io/charts
helm repo update

helm install falco falcosecurity/falco \
  --namespace falco --create-namespace \
  --set falcosidekick.enabled=true \
  --set falcosidekick.config.slack.webhookurl="https://hooks.slack.com/services/xxx" \
  --set falcosidekick.config.slack.minimumpriority=warning \
  --set driver.kind=ebpf

# Tetragon policy: process execution monitoring
apiVersion: cilium.io/v1alpha1
kind: TracingPolicy
metadata:
  name: monitor-process-execution
spec:
  kprobes:
    - call: "security_bprm_check"
      syscall: false
      args:
        - index: 0
          type: "linux_binprm"
      selectors:
        - matchBinaries:
            - operator: "In"
              values:
                - "/bin/bash"
                - "/bin/sh"
                - "/usr/bin/curl"
                - "/usr/bin/wget"
          matchNamespaces:
            - namespace: Mnt
              operator: NotIn
              values:
                - "host_mnt_ns"

---
# Tetragon policy: network connection monitoring
apiVersion: cilium.io/v1alpha1
kind: TracingPolicy
metadata:
  name: monitor-network-connections
spec:
  kprobes:
    - call: "tcp_connect"
      syscall: false
      args:
        - index: 0
          type: "sock"
      selectors:
        - matchArgs:
            - index: 0
              operator: "NotDAddr"
              values:
                - "127.0.0.1"
                - "10.0.0.0/8"

# SecretStore configuration (AWS Secrets Manager)
apiVersion: external-secrets.io/v1beta1
kind: SecretStore
metadata:
  name: aws-secrets
  namespace: production
spec:
  provider:
    aws:
      service: SecretsManager
      region: ap-northeast-2
      auth:
        jwt:
          serviceAccountRef:
            name: external-secrets-sa

---
# ExternalSecret definition
apiVersion: external-secrets.io/v1beta1
kind: ExternalSecret
metadata:
  name: db-credentials
  namespace: production
spec:
  refreshInterval: 1h
  secretStoreRef:
    name: aws-secrets
    kind: SecretStore
  target:
    name: db-credentials
    creationPolicy: Owner
  data:
    - secretKey: username
      remoteRef:
        key: prod/database
        property: username
    - secretKey: password
      remoteRef:
        key: prod/database
        property: password

# Vault SecretProviderClass
apiVersion: secrets-store.csi.x-k8s.io/v1
kind: SecretProviderClass
metadata:
  name: vault-db-creds
  namespace: production
spec:
  provider: vault
  parameters:
    vaultAddress: "https://vault.example.com"
    roleName: "app-role"
    objects: |
      - objectName: "db-username"
        secretPath: "secret/data/prod/database"
        secretKey: "username"
      - objectName: "db-password"
        secretPath: "secret/data/prod/database"
        secretKey: "password"

---
# Using in Pod
apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
metadata:
  name: app
spec:
  serviceAccountName: app-sa
  containers:
    - name: app
      image: myapp:latest
      volumeMounts:
        - name: secrets
          mountPath: "/mnt/secrets"
          readOnly: true
  volumes:
    - name: secrets
      csi:
        driver: secrets-store.csi.k8s.io
        readOnly: true
        volumeAttributes:
          secretProviderClass: vault-db-creds

SLSA Level 1 - Provenance:
- Build process documented
- Automated build

SLSA Level 2 - Build Service:
- Hosted build service
- Signed provenance generated
- Version-controlled source

SLSA Level 3 - Build Integrity:
- Isolated build environment
- Tamper-resistant provenance
- Source integrity guaranteed

SLSA Level 4 - Dependencies:
- Recursive assurance for all dependencies
- Reproducible builds
- (Currently theoretical)

# SLSA Provenance generation in GitHub Actions
name: SLSA Build

on:
  push:
    tags: ['v*']

permissions:
  contents: read
  packages: write
  id-token: write

jobs:
  build:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    outputs:
      digest: "${{ steps.build.outputs.digest }}"
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@v4

      - name: Build and push
        id: build
        uses: docker/build-push-action@v5
        with:
          push: true
          tags: "ghcr.io/${{ github.repository }}:${{ github.ref_name }}"

  provenance:
    needs: build
    uses: slsa-framework/slsa-github-generator/.github/workflows/generator_container_slsa3.yml@v2.0.0
    with:
      image: "ghcr.io/${{ github.repository }}"
      digest: "${{ needs.build.outputs.digest }}"
    secrets:
      registry-username: "${{ github.actor }}"
      registry-password: "${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}"

Security CI/CD Pipeline:
┌─────┐   ┌──────┐   ┌──────┐   ┌──────┐   ┌──────┐   ┌──────┐
│Build│ -> │ Scan │ -> │ Sign │ -> │Attest│ -> │Verify│ -> │Deploy│
└─────┘   └──────┘   └──────┘   └──────┘   └──────┘   └──────┘
  |          |          |          |          |          |
 Build     Vuln       cosign     SBOM      Kyverno   Signature
 image     scan       signing   attestation  policy   verified
          Trivy               SLSA         check      deploy
          Grype              provenance

# kube-bench: run CIS Kubernetes Benchmark
kube-bench run --targets master,node

# Kubescape: NSA, MITRE, CIS framework scan
kubescape scan framework cis-v1.23 --exclude-namespaces kube-system

# Scan specific control
kubescape scan control C-0002 --namespace production

# Kubescape YAML scan
kubescape scan .